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KEY: NIGERIA HAS "GOOD RISK" BORROWING ABIIIn'
Expenditure
Capital expenditure (Il million) .
dlo share in total expenditure (Olo) ..
Recurrent expenditure (M million) ..
Olo share in total expenditure (Olo) ..
Money ~uppgy (Ms) (II million)
~ (currency in circulation & demand deposits) .
~ (livings and time deposits) , .
~ as Olo of~ .
~ as CI10 of internal debt· ..
Debl TriP
Size of debt trap (measured by ratio of capital expenditure --
locked up capital -- to recurrent expehditure -- unlocked capital) ..
capital expenditure - external debt ratio·· ..
Debt service payments as Olo of export earnings (070) .
Mal'llinal propensity to import ..






















Unlocking of Capital leads to Size reduction of DF1IT TRAP
indicates CREDIT WOR1lIINEiS~
backed lip by Government measures to RESTRUCIURE THE
NIGERIAN ECONOMY to reduce overdependence on imports.
kl~:· 70 pa- cent and 47 per cent of internal loans were utilised for providing liquidity (MIl in years 1982 and 1983 respenively.
"In 1982, one naira of external debt financed I.S naira work of capital expenditure: in 1983, one naira of extemaldebt financed 90 kobo of capital
expenditure -- the result of import restrictions and consequent operation of industriesat less than optimum capacity.
"·Corresponding figures for 1981 were as follows: Brazil; 33.60/0; Mexico; 29.5 Olo.
...
S'l'R1.G"ZGY FOR OPTUrrZHfG RETmm3 IN THE IHGERIAN PETROLEUN
SECTOR: bClkl~fqC ~~a cfkill~CfAi ~sr~AdbMbkq ANALYSIS*
BY
DON N, lIlli, M.A., Ph.D.,
READER IN ECONOr-rrCS,
DEPA..QTr-lI%TT OF FINAJ.1CE,
INSTITUTE OF f:.1ANAGEr,1EHT l\ND TECHNOLOGY,
ENUGU, NIGERIA
Oil exploration started in Nigeria in the year 1908 when a German
eompany called Bitumen made an abortive attempt. In late 1950s oil was
dis~overed in ~yfideriaI and 1.8 million barrels of oil valued at ~:1TS
million was exported from the COW1try in 1958. 1
The oil companies which prospected for oil included Shell D. Arcy
(1938), Mobil (1955) and subsequent entrants Agip, Phillips, Elf, Tenneco,
Ashland and Sunray. The eeolog~cal work done showed that the Sourthern
part of Figeria, principally the Niger Delta Region had much of the nation's
petroleum potential. Activities shifted to this region.
In 1953, Shell B.P. hit an oil rock in Akata, Cross River State. In the
midw50s oil was discovered in Oloibiri and Domu in the Rivers State; Nigeria
thus becnme estnblished as an oil producin,e terri tory. The Niger Delta
subsequently has been inundated by prospecting firms in search of petroleum
in this area representing American, British, Dutch, Italian, French, German
and Japanese interest. 2
Government plays a significant role in the NiGerian oil industry by
granting licences to prospective ~ompaniesK Further, Government established
the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NlTOC) in 1971 and the Ministry of
Petroleum Resources in 1975. The Ministry determined petroleum policies
while the Corporation was empowered to explore, produce store and market
crude petroleum and its refined products. 3 In 1976, following
reorganisation in the oil industry the rfq~lC and the Ministry were merged to
~reate the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Ek~~CF by decree.
In deriving a strategy for optimizing returns from the oil industry we
have to look at both Nigerian oil pricing strategy and also her continued
membership in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
The pricing strategy would be consistent with optimizing





- lDo:i1nvD~ur-l-r-:-tI-sEuFks--t 0-- inc1:-cvclCK-~iccs-1D1tKen--·clvmntl is-inelas-tie-.and to
reduce :;:Jrices l'lhs.=JR thoro is a Glut - - a lack of effective Jeo[md in the
rnrket. A hiGher price 1·,hen clcnanC. is inelastic .\l"Ould lea(1 to output/
revonue nnxiDUD. A lower price in a Glut situ~tion DnnifestinG hiCh
elasticity of de::l.::mcl 1'iOuld enhance revenue, since at 0. 101'lor price a
GI'eater qwmti ty ,wuld be dischareed.
The OPEC is ,:"n interntltional cartel Gnconpassinc 13 countries of which
Nigeria is one. It is a c8ntr,:,,1 ~ddncy appointed and to which the
countrics concerned dolegate iluthority not only to decide on the price ~t
"lhich their crucle oil could be sold but :l.lso to decide on allocation of
production quotns to c.:lch. The opera.tion of cartels Generally have been
in the direction of restrictinG output in order to naintain high prices.
OPEC IvaS established in 1960 to perfoTIj the follovJinC fWlCtions:
(i) to protect the revenue of producin; Deober countries as far
as possible froD the effects of disequilibriw~ arisD1G froD
oxcess of supply over donnncl. This it trios to I.lchieve
through firing prices and quo....'1.ti ty to be produced by each
ncmbor country; and
(ii) to ennble the growing novemmt of devoloping countries to
reduce so far 3:8 possible, the influence of Western
industrialised countries on their ocononies .:lnd societies.
It tries to bring this nbmlt by acceleratinG the General
enhJnccd.position of influence thQt tho governoent of the
producD1G countries have obtQined.
Nigeria joined OPEC only in 1971. Even liefore joining OPEC, by
Decree NUD,bet' I of 1:967, the terns of the OPEC ''lere inposed on the oil
ooop~ios prospecting L'1. kiceri~K The effect of this was to coopel the
conpanies to D.creeto tl posted price 2S :lcninst the realized price for
oil as the basis for conputinG taxes, royo.lties and rent, and to treat
royalties as: a business expense 1'3.ther tlwll a full tax offset :1.3 vms
forr:wrly the case. Th.roUGh these CJ'4.'U1Ces the Federal Governnen t W.:lS seen
as surrendering pJ.rt of :111 Qnticip...'lted increi1s0 iri production rates in
order to cain a greater percentace increase in tax revenue per barrel. 4
?RICING gg~a ODTPUT POLICY
Ttlble I belo~ shovro a distribution of output, exports and prices of
Nigerian petroleun products between 1970 and 19G1. The prices have shown
an upwtlTd trend, i~1KPP per bt'..rrel in 1970 to iJ22.44/blll'rel in 1981. The
only exception to the up1~rd trond 1vas the irop froo n1.94/btlTrel in 1971
to N1.0r/btlTrol in 1972.
On tho othor hand tGtal ~roduction had not shovill 0. consistent upward
'trend. In 1:970, 395,036,000 Qlll'rels 1"01'0 produced. This {';I'm.. to
-:J;-
.----.....
- ---51i3......62Q,-OOo-mrrols- in 1901. Thus ''lhilo prices rose by 8.lnost 2,000 per
cent clurinC this period (1970.-1981), output gre"l'T by loss thon 100 per cent.
Grovrth in pricos ha.vo qui to outdistnncecl L;'Tm'lth in output. Deu.'l.nd
(incluclinc dennncl for donostic consunption nnu exports) "I'IUS highly in-
elnstic dictc'ltinC the; hiGh prices. The hiGh prices are thus justified in
terus of u'lxiuizinC total rovenue fron the petroleun sector. The total
revenue; in the last collJ.lJYl of To.blo I belovT sho"l'TS rl fairly consistont
upward trend except for 1975, 1970 ~nd 1901.
As ·co.n be seen in qn~Flo I bebroon 1975 and 1981 output htlS actually
fallen while prices hnvo risen. Output (lfhich ropresents dooond for
donostic o.nd external use) foIl froD 651,507,000 barrols to 513,620,000
barrels reflecting tho low of£octive dou'lnd resulting fron the world oil
Glut; while prices roso fran in. 27 par barrel to rJ22. 44 per barreL The
hiGh prices of pctroleuD in the world r~rket even in the face of world
oil glut is consistent vnth ocononic rationo.lity.
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Year Production ( '000 barrels)
-
An...YJ.uc:l Daily LvorfJ:go Tot('000 b·
t l970 395,036 1,OEH 3D3,
1971 550,679 1 ,531i 542,
1:972 643,207 1 ~ 757 650,
1973 750,593 2.,056 723,
1:974 023,31iO O~ORS 795,
1975 651 ,507 1 ~ 750 627,
1976 750,050 O~MT1 736;<.
1977 766,05 t, 2,099 T!s~K
1'973 692,269 1 ;029 667,
1979 042;474 2,308 OW,
1980 752,498 2;056 t 691J ,1981 513,622 1,430 443,
SOURCES: (a) N,mnlaro, G. O. (Prof.) liThe Petroleun Industry 'in NiGeria's
EconoDY", Eentrnl Bank of NiGeria Bullion (LaGOS, October-
aUcU~1ber 1"il2) .




l~qC;---t;Dls--bcrrr-in Dq9SM~ne;dnCir Irnq, _as a; child 'of expediency.
~~_K
'--'TIm- ~grcOr;cnt settine up OFEC I"D-8 sequel to the unilateral roduction in
oil pricY:i :W Dul tino. tional oil conpanies in 1'959 and 1960. The
rmltin,. bonr:.1 corporations then controlled all operations in tho oil
indl.,-sb:;r only to suit their foreie]l interosts. The fOWldo. tion neDbers
of OFE:; ..iere five, today the Orco.nisati on has CT01ffi in stronG-rth and




( f~F Caxibbean and
Lntin .ADorica'.
Nicerio., Libya, Algeria and Gabon
Saudi lJabia, Iraq, Iran, hr~BitI Qatar
and the United ..",rab Enirates ErKl~CKF
Indonesi<1:.
Venezuola ~llld Ecuador
Generally OPEC h:18. b,;Ol1 able to cain control for the fixinG of tho
qunnti ty to bo IJroducecl, the llricGs ::mdhave co-ordinilted a unified oil
policy of TJcnber nations. OPEC nOI" exercisos full control over the
sellinG price of their Cf~ldc oil. In 1964, it achievod its first nnjor
I
breo.k-t1rrot1.Ch by pressinG on the oil' conp,::tnies to :l.b'ree on a unifoITl rate
for roy,."ltics throu[Shout the nenber nations nnd to"mrds the and of the
1,9600 OPEC hOod L1D extensive Deo.sure of control on the oil conlinnics. In
lD70 O:2)<;C j·~cabE:rs I national oil conpaniGs 1vere controllinG about 3 per
ce;n og~ t~gOirFil con1xmies I operations, by 1975 the fiture hns risen to
60 peg~ cent, cndpresently it is o.bout 90 per cent.
ybDqol~uM bClkl~rrC fkafCAqlop~*
kfdbof~ l~a LIBYA
T:D8 GrOT/eh in control of the oil industry by the OPEC smT continuous
rise in crude o:U prices nncl revenue for its ceubers. For instance, in
1970 ..,hile t:12 Governecnt take per bo.:rrel 1ms nlKS!~ for NiCe]:')!.£l, 0.. non-
OPEC Denber 0.1; the ticc;, the so.no fic.;ure for Libyo. vlUS ~g1K1;O/boKrrelI nn
OPEC IloDber. Ni[Serio.' joined OPEC in 1971 nnd since thon, the Governnent
to.ke per barrel has [,T01'ill to p..'lri ty Hi th tho ficure for other OPEC
DODbers. 1'he posted prices h-::.ve also t,'rmm for Nic;erio.. The posted
}lrDicEg~P ,·Jl1ich Core notiono.l Dagni tudes Dr}sed on planned nnd not realized
prices are the basis for conputinc tnxes, royaltios o.nd rent. 5 Thus
kigor~w by joinin~ OPEC and inplenentiug OPEC teros has considerably
enho.ncod rovenue fran the netroloun sector. These 0.1'0 as sh01ffi in Tnble
II belo"r.
*- I-b is pertinent to mention hero of Nigerian-·Libyan techno..economic
collabor:rcion entered into about 15 months ago: Wlder the ag-reement recently
signed, the D~I:rS c01mtries ..·.rill esto.blish shl'1rtly 0. Joint Bank and a Holding
Comp2.ny. A1PM~ ·the first meeting of the Joint Commission of filinisters of
Foreigll Affail"S, HQtionn.l Pla.nning and Petroleum is scheduled to be held in
Tripoli i~1 AIr il 1984.
,- ~ -
TABLE II
GOVERNNENT T1J(E PER BJ@1EL MID POSTED
PRICES OF CRUDE OIL: JlfIGERIA am LIBY/lo
(f? per barrel)
Governnent take per barrol Posted pricos per ro-rrel
Year -
Nigerin' Libye- JlTigeria Libya'
1970 0.64 t.12 2.420 2.55"0
1'971 1'.56 1. 67 3.1'78 3.399
1972 1.74 1 0"- 3.409 3.620.j)
r!973 2.88 2.00 G.1).0ft- 9.061
t9Tt1~ 7. 4~-· 11 .03 14.691 15.768
11975 1,0.51' 9.77 1i 3.070 1.6.060
1976 10.47 1'1.36 13.160 112.620
11977 1'.2.87 11. 93 1!"to 570 ~4KOMM
1;978 1:2.1).8 1:2.11 1t1r.t20 1:3.850
1979 21.59 21 .59 2-5.61:0 2.5.600
1:980 32.77 32.77 39.233 38.300
1:981 34.90 34.90 1).0.408 4-O.72.D
1902 35.1 iO 35.10 39.2'4'r 40.950
I 1
plroCb~ Orcc.nisntion of PetrolOlllJ ExportinG COlmtries, l~
Statistical Bulletin (1982).
NIGERIL'S; OVER-DEPENDENCE ON CRUDE' OIL
Fedoral Govcrnnent revo-nuo [1.3, percent8J[;O of tot~l revenue grew fron
2.6 per cent in 1'970 to G2; per cent in 190t. This proportion was. 82 per
cent in 1974 ;mel 81 p?r cent in 1:981. The stro.teG'J is; increo.sod prices
and reduced output quotas for neUbc~s in ordor to n~ntnin the prices:
at hiGh levels.
1lJicerin t soil reser',ros crc~D: fron ,:t figure of 9.3 bi llion barrels
in 1i970 to 16.7 billion b::rrrels in 1980. Although the re-servos
renched n high nark of 20.9 billion bc.rrel& in 1974, this hns been
6 tdrawn dOl-n1 to 1:6.7 billion in 1980. Theso'rosorvos represent O~R per
~Mnt of world total reserves vQth lifo years of 33 yenrs. 7 qn~s by the
year 2013 exactly 33 years; frOD 1;900, 1 iGoriCL ' s oil reserves win be
expected to deplete. Sinco oil is 0. depletinG ~ssctI the price and
output str2.tGcy of OPEC is p~tently in the diroction of f1...:lxicizinc
revenue ns it he-s built-in conservo.tion st~tof;y for Niceria. HiCh
prices QnQ low outDut woul~ increo.so tho lifo years of our depleting oil
assets. Conpared to other OPEC countries, tho life yee-rs of our oil
ntJ'3ets are QuonG the lOVTost. The correspondinG life yenrs for sone--other
OPEC o.nd non-OrEC countrios m"o as. follovls:
- t!) -
. --0.:-;' 1(] i r, ·ca-bi 0;-- -(4~-~1t9P4-Lmn--< 1114). ~ .Iwric 0 (65), U.iL.E• (58),
Iraq (91), Libya_ ( 58), dc.8 The inninent terninal horizon of
oil a~pBts dictatos the need for a conservation strategy which is reflected
by present OPEC strategy, viz, hiGh prices, low output.
RECENT TRENDS
Today OPEC qh~ lost its cohesion. The nost recent price cut in 1903
is the first price reduction in OPEC's-25 year history. The price
reduction wa~ necessitated by the glut in the world n~rket that ~~fested
i taelf nost viciously in 1'982/03 selling season. The OPEC production has
frrllen frOD an average of 31 Dillion barrels por day in 1979 to 14 Dillion
barrels per day in 1983. 9 m~rt of the decline in dcnand is due to world
eoonoDic recession .:lnd pnrt to .:l further sh·~ft fron oil to other enerf,'Y
res.ources by the conSUDors. Nore inportantly OPEC has lost a big chunk
of the oil oarket to non-OPEC nonbers. In 1980, OPEC accounted for 60 per
cent of oil consUDod in tho non-coonunist world, but now (1983) it sells
only les~ than 40 per cent of this. BiG new producers like EnGland,
Mexioo .:lnd NOTIfay have taken up the balance - - they are closer to tho
Qonsuners and are seen as nore reliable.
These countries would rcndily cut prices in order to keep revenues up,
as England did in rrny 1982 preeipitatinG n price war as it were. OPEC
meDbers can no lonGer be trusted to ndhere to the cartel's price structure
as: they try to .oopete ,nth these now rivals. Nigorin for instance,
unilaterally reduced her price to conpete with British price cut in~hy
1\983 ,ri thout reference to OPEC, althoueh this 1ms. Inter ratified nS the
new OPEC price in the subsequent London OPEC noeting. Other OPEC n@Dbers
followed suit in order to oaintain their erounds in a shrinking oil ~ketK
Secret discountinC on 2LTGcd OPEC prices have been the order of the day.
This trend has ca:l1ed to question the ability of OPEC to oaintmn
high prices in the·oil n~ketK Since OPEC presently contoIs about 40 per
.ent of the narket, it can still naintain substantial influence in the
narket. OPEC does not now ~oainnte the narket as it did before nnd up till
1980. The presence of alternative conpetitors reduces the elasticity of
deoand for OPEC oil. Thus prices cannot now be onintained at the highest
level consistent ~nth profit nnxiDUD. Prices would ~~ve to fa~lI but not
to a perfectly coopetitive level since OPEC can still act in unison to keep
prices fairly high. More co-operation with non-OFEC nenbers can work in
the interest of hieh prices nnd onmnced revenue. Conpoti tion vTould reduce
the revenue situation instead of enhnncinc it. Co-operation is seen as a
better strnte[Dr. The extent to which OPEC can still mnipulate prices frOD
- 7 -
___~ ~K;ouKlKirlKepe~her---{F:mbC-suKcKcoods .in..--co-operatinB' "'I'ri th
...-"
non-OrEC nenbers or decidos to conpote with consequent price war and
falling prices and revenues.
As shown in Table III, the erowth in oil revenue rutS plateaued off
fron 1980. l.1-so both the slutre of oil in total covernnent revenue .and
the share of oil in Niceria's export revenue are very siGTlificantly high
proportions of the respective revenuu ~~cnitudesK The share of oil in
dovorru~ent revenue was 32 per cont in 1974 and 62 per cont in 1931, while
the share of oil in the export revenue ranged fran 03 por cent in 1973 to
98 per cent in 1901. Thus the oconony is seriously vulnerable to shocks
fron tho external sector relating in the deu~nd or lack of deu~nd for
Nigerian oil.
Tf..BLE III
CONTRIBUTION OF THE CRUDE OIL SECTOR
yo THE kfdboll~ bClkl~fq
•







revenue(n billion) 1.. 7 4.54 5.51 6.77 8.08 7.37 1iO.911 t5.00 1;4.75
3. Share of crude oil
in total Govern-
nont revenue
(per cent) 60 02· 70 79 75 63 81 70 62
4. Exports
(n billion) 2.3 5.8 tr .9 6.8 7.6 6.3 to.l 1:2'.8 10.5
5. Share of oil
in eXports
(per cent) 33 93 94 93 93 90 93 96 98
6. Inports
(n billion) 1:.2 1.7 5.7 5.1 G.t 8.11 7.1 0.7 1:0.8
4.09oK~} 1.06 3.01 3.55 3.1;3 1.51 2.1'6 4.71
7. Trado balance





SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, i~ual oe~orts and Statenent of Accounts
(vnxious issues).
- 8 -
The demand for Niccrinn oil re.:lched its 10'l'lCst ebb nost recently.
~vcrnce daily Droduction was 1.3 Trillion barrels per d.:lY in 1901. 1.0
o1llion barrels per day in 1902 and .:lbout 1.2 nillion b::1.rrels per day in
1903. 10 These are ouch lower than the fi,'>ures for 197/1, (2.21 Dillion
barrels per day) and for 1'970 (1.05 Dillion barrcJls per <1ny). The recent
drop in dennnd reflects the sliGht (one per cent) drop in world enerGY
de~~d for the periods 1979-1903. This drop in world enerGY dennnd led
to a Dore than 40 por cent drop in denand for l~DbC oil. 110
NIGERI1.' S lsr:nab~DbeabkCb ON nONOSECTOR
(CRUDE OIL) IS TO DE REDUCED
It is necessary to diversify the nn.tion's revenue source in order to
strenethen its capccity to nbsorbtho i~pnct effect of further shortfalls
in dctlDlld for oil. Further diversificrrtion would be in the direction of
naxinizinc our revenue tnse. Fluctuntions in tho donand for oil will be
evened out if revenue sources nre diversifiGd.
(i) in the first instance efforts should bo Dade to intensify
Niccrin's non-oil exports espccio.:lly of cocon. r;roundnuts.
ootton, pnlo oil produce, tin, Gnd seIIl-nnnufacturos. If
this is done to the extent that the share of crude oil in
Nicerin's Govornnent revenue anu eul~rts ar8 respectively
less than 50 per cent. then the econony would be in n
better position to absorb the frequent· shocks froD the
external sector;
(ii) it uny be necessary to invest in Hestcrn industri.:llised
econooies usinc our externnl nesets. Instead of holdinG
these assets in nore liquid forn enrninc little or no
interest, they cnn be invested in profitable projects in
Western industrialised econooies thereby earninc further
f orei@1 exch..m,:;e;
Such projects could include dOvmstreaD operations in oil refineries·
and acconpanyinc distribution net works like l~trolera service
stations and also in SODe non--oil projects,
In periods of low sales the nntion coulu utilise foreiGn exchand~
enrninG's fron such l)rofi tc..ble ventures to aucnent· the reduced returns fron
oil sales and thus be provided ,dth ... nore elastic forei{)1 Gxchrulc;e to
finance developnent projects. ICU1'l.:1i t and Vcnezuelc.. (O:i'EC countries) have
done this to their financi.:l1 benefit. Nic;erin can do the snDe to opti-
[r~ her returns froD the oil sector.
- 9 -
CONCLUSIONS
'* Up till 19[,0, the deDood for OrEC oil "lms inelastic. CrEC controlled
about 60 per cent of free world dea~nd and aanipul~ted both prices and
output in their Olm favour. The hiDl prices that were Generated reflected
the nonopolistic iJower of OrEC in the ,....orlc1 oil tlnrket. I'resence of
non-OrEC coopetitors since 1900 has dral,m a wed[~ on OPEC price strategy.
OIEC's slli~re of free world ~~rket hils fallen to ~l per cent, but OPEC is
still asic;nificant factor in the narkct. Co-operation between OrEC and
non-orEC producers I1S evidenced in tho fi~y 1903 London OrEC parley would
still work in the C';'encral interest of world oil producers. Conpeti tion
would lead to Im'i"crinc prices I~md depleted revenue.
* It is expected th~t world oil den,end vnll pick up after econooic
recCNeryfroo the present (1983) recession. It is estinated that world
denand woulcl c;r01'i" to CO Dillion barrels por day in 1985. tl2 :il'EC oil is
expected to continue to be an inportnnt factor in the world nnrket for
oil, and consunption in OPEC and other developinc countries is cxpected
to rise.
* The strate[~ of Inch prices Gnd low output of OrEC is still 11
nnxinizinC strateGY, in enhancinG revonue anone OrEC countries. Dermnd
elasticities would continue to be low as OrEC lli~ipulates outlmt to
oaintllin acceptable prices. Niceria's [~nbership of OPEC has been
beneficial to the NiGerian econooy. Continued nenbership would be in
the econooic interest of the Nation.
* Recently there has been a call for OrEC to raise NiGeria's oil
production quota fron the present ceilinG of 1.35 [lillion barrels per
day to a hicher ficure. The ~lota did not take into consideration the
needs of the Nicerian econoDy as evidenced by a hiGh population fiGUXe.
OPEC quotas are larGely a reflection of the respective countries' oil
reserves and past output n~[~itudes vnthout siGnificant weichts d~ven to
the populntion base of particir.k.'1tinC nenber countries. This, is why n.
sparsely populated country like Saudi Arabia (popUlation: 10nillion) wns
given a quota of SK~ tnllion barrels per day while Niceria, a hiGhly
populated country (populdion: 100 uillion) was Given a quota of 1.35
Dillion barrels per day. This paper contends that the quota Given to
Niceria does not reflect Niceria's hiCh financial needs and that an
appropriate quota ahould do so sinco a country's financial needs ,would
deternine her vTillincness to continuo o.s a nenber and reduce illl often
utilised resort to overshootinc production quotas thus, destabili~inc the
em-tel- nrro.n:.;enent. In roco{;ni tion of Niceria's ,'i'orseninc balance of
paynents probleus and her larce population base, OlJEC, throuc;h Nigeria's
request, should consider raisinc the nation's production quota to 2.3
Dillion barrels per day. This fii;ure should be considered since Nigeria:.
CEl1l produce this qUD.Il. ti ty (1979 Niceria' s output quot[\.) and in recoG'l1.i tion
of the hiCh financial requirenonts to resuscitate the ailinc Nigerian
econooy.
* ,;.lso there has been a call for the settinl:: up of :m Orca.niso.tion of
!~rican Oil Exporting COW1tries. This Orcanisation would conprise !~can
neDbers of OrEC to wit: NiGeria, Libya, Alcoria and Gabon. This
Orcanisation could functi~n as a pressure croup within OrEC and not as a
eartel within a cartel. Since there is a parrallel Arab arrancenent - -
The Or,.;anisation of Arab Oil EX].)ortin,i Countries, the settinr7 up of the
African variety would be a step in the richt direction.
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• NiGeria should explore further avenues for core bilateral barter
aGTOOnen ts involvin(; the inport of technolocy, equipnent, n:mpower
and the eXl)Orts of oil since those arr~1E~aents do not nornally fall
wi thin ·the OPEC oil quota. Such barter arran(;enents would help conserve
the naion I s depleted foreicn exhnn::e reserves. A b~tor arran,-;enent
could be used to nodify the Kaduna refinery to process 100 per cent
Nicerian crude. Forei,7l technoloGY could be inported fron .Japan, India.,
Indonesia, etc. to help transforD the Ko.c1una refinery to a staee of
independence frOB the heavy Venezuelt:m crude. 1Irr[lgl~;eaent for processinG
Venezuelan heavy crude should be seen as tenporary and not be relied upon
as a lonr; rUJl solution since in praxis the inport has been irrecular and
leave refinin~ outfit unenployed fran tine to tine. For the purpose of
achievinr; self reliance in donostic oil refiniw; cal\-qci ty, the oil policy
should stipulate that 100 per cent Nir;erian crude should find their way
into our fefininc; outfits.
1~ alnost every OPEC nenber has full control over their oil assets,
Professor B.ll Kf~K SI'lafJy has recoIJDended for Nic;eria' s conplete take over
of 1 00 per cent shares of all oil prospectin~; conpanies in Nigeria.
Presently ryvernnent has about 70 per cent s!v:lre participation in the
petroleun inclustry.13 lIe also reconnended 100 per cent take-over by the
Federal Governnent of nll retai 1 narketini:: of petroleun products as he
d th t H· • It· . It·· t· t . . th Id 1/~arcue a In.(;erHl. s expel' lse In rur{e In:
o
• lS conpe l lVe In e ..101' 0
This would be a loE~cal culrUnation of the trend of state control in
OPEC countries. Ni,;eria should not be left out in PKdoptin:-~ OPEC terns as
today 90 per cent of assets of oil cODIJanies in OPEC r1Guber countries are
controlled by their respective State·-o'\·med national oil corporations.
Complete control vTould plli{; the leakaces froIl the oil sector, conserve
revenue and reduce profit repatriation.
NiGeria's continued g~eabership of OPEC and conplete adoption of OrEC
terns is a lo;~cal consequence of the optiaizin~ tendency of OPEC strate,:y
in the li{;ht of world econonic circuLlstances. Further it is recormended
that NiGBria's revenue sources be diversified in order to strenethen the
oapacity of the nation to absorb external shocks frOD the external secto~
and also enhance revenue. In this direction non-oil exports should be
strenGthened and investnents of Niceria's external, assets in productive
outlets in developed capitalist econonies should be considered a la
Kuwait, Venezuela strate~y to enhance earninCs of foreii~ exchange, to
aW,,'uent foreign reserves durinG low denand periods.
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